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Developmental Psychology
Developmental psychology studies change in psychological structures and processes during the life cycle. Although traditionally focused on childhood and adolescence, it has extended its scope to adulthood and old age as well. Two factors stimulated the rise of developmental psychology towards the end of the nineteenth century. First, Darwin’s claim of continuity between humans and nature revived the discussion among philosophers such as Locke, Kant and Rousseau regarding the origins of mind. It was hoped that the study of childhood would unlock the secrets of the relationship between animal and human nature. Darwin himself kept notebooks on the development of his first child, setting a trend that was to be followed by many of the great names in the discipline.
Given Darwin’s role in the genesis of developmental psychology, it is hardly surprising that biological views, in which development is regarded as the unfolding of genetically programmed characteristics and abilities, have been strongly represented in it. (Indeed, the etymological root of the word development means ‘unfolding’.) Typical of such views are Stanley Hall’s theory that development recapitulates evolution, Sigmund Freud’s account of the stages through which sexuality develops, Arnold Gesell’s belief in a fixed timetable for growth, John Bowlby’s notion of attachment as an instinctive mechanism and Chomsky’s model of inborn language-processing abilities. Since 1990 the field of ‘behavioural genetics’ (see Plomin et al. 2001) has received a boost from the spectacular advances in molecular biology that have made possible the identification of the approximately 30,000 genes in human DNA. However, most of the evidence for genetic influences on individual differences in development still comes from more traditional quantitative studies involving twins and adopted children: there have been few successes up to now in identifying the genes responsible for specific traits, though this field is still in its infancy.
However, those who place their faith in the influence of the environment have also had a major influence on developmental psychology. Behaviourism, which attributes all change to conditioning, may have failed to account satisfactorily for many developmental phenomena, but its attempts to imitate the methodology of the natural sciences have left an indelible imprint on the discipline. Most developmental psychologists now eschew extreme nature or nurture viewpoints and subscribe to one form or other of interactionism, according to which development is the outcome of the interplay of external and internal influences. The second factor that stimulated the growth of developmental psychology was the hope of solving social problems. Compulsory education brought about a growing realization of the inadequacy of traditional teaching methods and a call for new ones based on scientific understanding of the child’s mind. The failures of nineteenth-century psychiatry prompted a search for the deeper causes of mental disturbances and crime, widely assumed to lie in childhood. The application of developmental psychology to these social problems led to the creation of cognitive, emotional and social subdisciplines, with the unfortunate side-effect that the interrelatedness of these facets of the person has often been overlooked.
In the field of cognitive development, the contribution of the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget (1896–1980) has been unparalleled, though by no means unchallenged. Piaget developed his own form of interactionism (constructivism) in which the child is biologically endowed with a general drive towards adaptation to the environment or equilibrium. New cognitive structures are generated in the course of the child’s ongoing confrontation with the external world. Piaget claimed that the development of thought followed a progression of discrete and universal stages, and much of his work was devoted to mapping out the characteristics of these stages. His theory is often regarded as a biological one – yet for Piaget the developmental sequence is not constrained by genes, but by logic and the structure of reality itself.
Full recognition of Piaget’s work in the USA had to await a revival of interest in educational problems during the mid-1950s and the collapse of faith in behaviourism known as the cognitive revolution that followed in 1960. Subsequently, however, developmental psychologists such as Jerome Bruner challenged Piaget’s notion of a solitary epistemic subject and revived ideas developed in Soviet Russia half a century before by Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934). As a Marxist, Vygotsky had emphasized the embeddedness of all thought and action in a social context; for him, thinking was a collective achievement, and cognitive development largely a matter of internalizing culture. His provocative ideas exert an increasing fascination on developmental psychologists. Others, however, maintain Piaget’s emphasis on the child as solitary thinker, and seek to understand the development of thought by reference to computer analogies or neurophysiology. The study of social and emotional development was mainly motivated by concerns over mental health, delinquency and crime. The first serious developmental theory in this area was that of Sigmund Freud; invited to the USA by Stanley Hall in 1909, his psychoanalytic notions were received enthusiastically for a time. For Freud, however, the origin of psychopathology lay in the demands of civilization (above all the incest taboo), and no amount of Utopian social engineering could – or should – hope to remove these. From 1920 onwards, US psychology increasingly abandoned Freud in favour of the more optimistic and hard-nosed behaviourism. However, the emotional needs of children were of scant interest to behaviourists, and it was not until the 1950s that John Bowlby (1907–90) established a theoretical basis for research on this topic by combining elements of psychoanalysis, animal behaviour studies and system theory into attachment theory. Bowlby’s conception of the biological needs of children was informed by a profoundly conservative vision of family life, and his initial claims about the necessity of prolonged, exclusive maternal care were vigorously challenged in the rapidly changing society of the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, his work helped to focus attention on relationships in early childhood, which have now become a major topic in developmental psychology. New awareness of the rich and complex social life of young children has undermined the traditional assumption that the child enters society (becomes socialized) only after the core of the personality has been formed. Critics of developmental psychology point to its tendency to naturalize middle-class, Western ideals as universal norms of development, to its indifference to cultural and historical variations, and to the lack of a unified theoretical approach. However, its very diversity guarantees continued debate and controversy, and its own development shows no signs of coming to a halt.
Fluid Intelligence
Fluid intelligence is the set of cognitive processes that people bring to solving novel tasks and representing, manipulating, and learning new information. Consequently, fluid intelligence is an important construct in educational psychology because it attempts to describe and explain aspects of the individual that influence how, and how well, people solve unfamiliar problems and learn previously unfamiliar material. The history, nature, and current controversies surrounding fluid intelligence are herein reviewed.
Early research in intelligence proposed that intelligence was composed of a single, unitary characteristic (known as general intelligence, or g) and a relatively large number of specific abilities. Whereas g was viewed as broad ability having a profound effect on learning, problem solving, and adaptation, specific abilities were viewed as narrow and largely trivial. However, subsequent research differentiated intellectual abilities that were based, in large part, on culturally specific, acquired knowledge (known as crystallized abilities, or gc) and intellectual abilities that were less dependent on prior knowledge and cultural experiences (known as fluid abilities, or gf ). Although this work was primarily influenced by factor analysis of relationships among cognitive tests, prediction of future learning, experimental studies, and other forms of evidence also supported the crystallized versus fluid distinction. More modern research has identified other abilities in addition to crystallized and fluid abilities (e.g., working memory, quantitative reasoning, visualization), although scholars have not yet agreed on the exact number and nature of these abilities and whether these abilities are independent faculties or subordinate to g: In contrast, there is strong consensus on the distinction between fluid and crystallized intellectual abilities and their substantial roles in human learning and adaptation.
Contemporary neuroscience defines fluid intelligence as cognitive processing independent of specific content. Fluid intelligence is characterized by the ability to suppress irrelevant information, sustain cognitive representations, and manage executive processes. Measures of fluid intelligence are strong predictors of cognitively demanding tasks, including learning, education, vocational performance, and social success, particularly when such performance demands new learning or insight rather than reliance on previous knowledge. Research also suggests strong biological influences on the development of, and individual differences in, fluid intelligence. For example, studies demonstrate that (a) fluid intelligence is more heritable than most other cognitive characteristics; (b) localization of fluid intelligence operations in the prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala, and hippocampus; (c) life-span changes associating neurotransmitter decreases with decrements in fluid intelligence; (d) moderate associations between neural speed of response/ conduction and (untimed) measures of fluid intelligence; (e) that unusual exposure to language (e.g., deafness, nonstandard language background) has little effect on the development and performance of fluid intellectual abilities; and (f) fluid abilities have been rising steadily in Western countries for over a century in contrast to relatively stable crystallized abilities (i.e., the Flynn effect). Although there is an association between environmental advantages (e.g., parental education, socioeconomic status) and fluid intelligence, this association may be partly or entirely explained by gene-environment correlations. There is little evidence to suggest that deliberate environmental interventions (e.g., compensatory education programs) substantially influence fluid intelligence, although such programs may have at least shortterm effects on crystallized intelligence. Nearly all major clinical tests of intelligence include measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence. Most notably, tests that historically invoked different models of intellectual processes have recently adopted a hierarchical model in which measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence (and sometimes other abilities) are viewed as subordinate to general intelligence.
Mental Age
Mental age is a central concept in the study of intelligence measurement. Jerome Sattler defined mental age as ‘‘the degree of general mental ability possessed by the average child of a chronological age corresponding to the MA score’’ (p. 172). As an example, a child assessed with a mental age of 9 is viewed as having the general mental ability of an average 9-year-old child.
From the perspective of intelligence measurement, each individual has two ages: a chronological age that is the number of years that the individual has been alive, and a mental age that is the chronological age of persons for which the test performance of the individual is the average test performance.
The mental age and the chronological age of an individual need not be the same. For example, if the mental age of an individual is greater than the chronological age of the individual, then one can infer that the individual has above-average intelligence or higher mental ability.
The mental age and the chronological age for an individual are used to determine the ratio IQ (intelligence quotient) of the individual. To compute the ratio IQ, one divides the mental age of an individual by the chronological age of the same individual and then multiplies that ratio by 100. For example, if a child has a mental age of 12 and a chronological age of 10, then the ratio IQ for that 10-year-old child is 120 (i.e., 12/10×100=120).
The ratio IQ was the measure of intelligence used in the 1916 and 1937 versions of the Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scale and on other tests of mental ability. The deviation IQ replaced the ratio IQ as the measure of intelligence used in subsequent measures of intelligence. The deviation IQ reflects the location of the test performance of an individual in a distribution of the test performances of other persons with the same chronological age as the individual, with the mean deviation IQ being typically equal to 100. For example, if an individual has a test performance that is less than the mean test performance for same-age peers, then the individual will have a deviation IQ less than 100. Neither the dated measure of ratio IQ nor the more contemporary measure of deviation IQ consistently provides concrete information as to the reasoning skills of individuals.
The mental age score may also be termed the ageequivalent score according to Sattler. The mental age score for an individual provides information as to what age group is most closely associated with the individual from the perspective of mental ability. As an example, a 12-year-old child with a mental age score of 14 indicates that the 12-year-old child has a mental ability more typical of 14-year-old children than of 12-year-old children.
Sattler noted that mental age scores have certain limitations. First, differences in mental age do not reflect the same differences in mental ability across the age spectrum. For example, the difference in mental ability between a mental age score of 5 and a mental age score of 2 tends to be greater than the difference in mental ability between a mental age score of 15 and a mental age score of 12. Second, the same mental age may reflect different capabilities for different individuals. For example, two children both with the mental age score of 12 may have answered different test items correctly.
Louis Thurstone was highly critical of the mental age concept. Thurstone argued that ‘‘the mental age concept is a failure in that it leads to ambiguities and inconsistencies’’ (p. 268). To Thurstone, mental age may be defined in two different ways. The mental age of an individual may be defined as the chronological age for which the test performance of the individual is average. The mental age of an individual may also be defined as the average chronological age of people who recorded the same test performance as the individual. To Thurstone, these two definitions do not engender the same numerical scores. In addition, if one accepts the first definition, one faces the problem that there may be many chronological ages for which a test performance is average. For example, a 16- year-old adolescent who provides a typical test performance for 16-year-old adolescents could be viewed as having a mental age of any score from an adolescent mental age score of 16 to an adult mental age score of 40. The average mental test performances of older adolescents and adults tend to be very similar. Thurstone did not support the continued use of mental age or IQ as a measure of intelligence. However, he did support the use of percentiles for sameage peers in designating personal mental abilities. For example, if the test performance of a 12-year-old child receives a score that is equal to the score of the median test performance among 12-year-olds, then that 12-year-old child may be viewed as receiving a percentile of 50 (i.e., the test performance of the 12-year-old child is equal to or greater than 50% of the test performances of all of the 12-year-old children who were tested). Despite the trenchant criticism of the mental age concept by Thurstone and the recognized limitations of mental age scores, noted commentators on intelligence such as Sattler and Lloyd Humphreys extolled the merits of the mental age score as an informative measure of mental ability. Both Sattler and Humphreys contended that the mental age score provides useful information about the mental capabilities of an individual. The mental age score provides information about the size and the level of maturity of the mental capabilities of an individual. The IQ score, whether the ratio IQ or the deviation IQ, provides no such information. Both Sattler and Humphreys contended that mental age will likely continue to be a popular and useful measure of mental ability. However, the suggestion by Thurstone that percentiles among same-age peers be used to index mental abilities continues to be worthy of further consideration. Only time will tell whether the percentile or some other index will replace mental age as a popular index of mental ability. http://www.englisharticles.info/2011/01/17/mental-age/
Multiple Intelligences
In 1983, Howard Gardner introduced his Theory of Multiple Intelligences in a seminal book, Frames of Mind. Based on his work as professor in the Harvard Graduate School of Education, his work as a psychologist researching brain injuries, and his long interest and involvement in the arts, he suggested that intelligence is not a single attribute that can be measured and given a number. He pointed out that I.Q. tests measure primarily verbal, logical-mathematical, and some spatial intelligence. Believing that there are many other kinds of intelligence that are important aspects of human capabilities, he proposed that they also include visual/spatial, bodily/kinesthetic, musical, interpersonal, and intrapersonal intelligences. More recently he added naturalist intelligence to this list and suggested that there may be other possibilities including spiritual and existential.
In 1984, New Horizons for Learning invited Dr. Gardner to present his theory to the world of education at a conference we designed for the Tarreytown Conference Center in New York. Subsequently, all of NHFL’s conferences were designed around the Theory of Multiple Intelligences, and Dr. Gardner has continued to write numbers of books expanding on the topic. At the present time educators throughout the world are finding effective ways to implement this theory as they seek to help students identify and develop their strengths, and in the process discover new, more effective ways of learning.
Learning Styles
Learning styles are the diverse ways in which people take in, process, and understand information. Educational technologies increase an instructor’s ability to design and implement teaching strategies that address a variety of learning styles. Researchers often distinguish between visual, auditory, and tactile-kinesthetic learners. Visual learners learn best by seeing and respond well to illustrations and diagrams; students considered auditory learners prefer listening and favor lectures and discussion, while tactile-kinesthetic learners, stimulated by movement and touch, thrive in active exploration of a topic or situation (Felder 1993). Webbased technologies facilitate the use of multimedia; they help move learning beyond a primarily text-based and linear arena into the cyclical world of sights, sounds, creativity, and interactivity. Computer-mediated communications tools such as e-mail, discussion boards, and virtual chat provide opportunities for interaction collaboration and discussion both inside and outside of the classroom.
Teachers, freed from the constraints of time and place, use technology to develop and deliver individualized instruction to a variety of learners (Kahn 1997). A number of online resources are available to help students and instructors identify their preferred learning and teaching styles; these include inventories, assessments, and questionnaires.
A more complex theory concerning the diverse ways people learn is Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences (MIS). Gardner distinguishes between learning styles and MI, suggesting “an intelligence entails the ability to solve problems or fashion products that are of consequence in a particular cultural setting or community” (Gardner 1993, 15). He approaches MI from a biological perspective, believing each person has a different intellectual composition made up of the following intelligences: verbal-linguistic (speaking, writing, and reading), mathematical-logical (reasoning skills), musical, visual-spatial, bodilykinesthetic, interpersonal, intrapersonal, naturalist, and existential (Gardner 2000). Humans possess all the intelligences in varying amounts and may utilize each one separately or jointly depending upon the learning situation (Gardner 1993).
Gardner (1993) recommends designing instruction and assessment that address the wide range of intellect present in the classroom. Often traditional instruction is geared toward verbal-linguistic and mathematical-logical intelligence, with instructors and designers failing to take into account the presence of other intelligences. Educational technology provides the platform upon which numerous instructional approaches can be developed and delivered in a timely and cost-effective manner. Table 1 identifies the attributes of each intelligence and provides examples of appropriate online teaching strategies to be used in an educational setting.
Examples of evaluation that remain sensitive to individual differences include portfolio development, journaling, and other types of reflective assessment (Gardner 1993). Personality inventories and temperament sorters provide another dimension to the discussion on learning styles. The most widely used personality type indicator is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), developed during World War II. A variety of academic disciplines and professional fields rely on results of the MBTI to provide direction on the development of collaborative learning and group activities. The Keirsey temperament sorter is another popular model of learning and has categories that correspond to the four pairs of MBTI preferences (Fairhurst and Fairhurst 1995).
Verbal-linguistic: Preference for reading, writing, and speaking Mathematical-logical: Aptitude for numbers, reasoning skills Musical: Ability to produce and appreciate pitch, rhythms; learns well through song Visual-spatial: Visual and spatial stimulation; learners enjoy charts, maps, and puzzles Bodily-kinesthetic: Good sense of balance and hand-eye coordination; handles objects skillfully Interpersonal: Ability to detect and respond to moods and motivations of others; tries to see things from another’s point of view Intrapersonal: Uses self-reflection to remain aware of one’s inner feelings Naturalist: Enjoyment of outdoors; ability to detect subtle differences in meaning Existential: Capacity to handle profound questions about existence
Empathy
In the last two decades, empathy and related emotional reactions have received increasing attention from social and developmental psychologists. This is probably because of the strong theoretical link between empathy (and related constructs such as sympathy) and both positive social behavior and social competence. The term empathy has been defined in many ways in the psychological literature. Although there is still disagreement regarding its definition, many social and developmental psychologists currently differentiate between various vicarious emotional responses to others’ emotions or state – which are generally viewed as empathy or related to empathy – and cognitive and affective perspective taking. Perspective taking involves the cognitive comprehension of another’s internal psychological processes such as thoughts and feelings. Whereas perspective taking often may result in empathy and related emotional responses (Batson, 1991), it is not the same as feeling something as a result of exposure to another’s emotions or condition.
Many theorists and researchers now use the term empathy to mean feeling an emotional response consistent with the emotions or situation of another. Some also use it to refer to related other-oriented reactions such as sympathy and compassion (Batson, 1991). However, it is useful to differentiate among empathy, sympathy, and personal distress. Specifically, empathy is defined as an emotional reaction to another’s emotional state or condition that is consistent with the other’s state or condition (e.g., feeling sad when viewing a sad person). Sympathy, which frequently may stem from empathy (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990), is defined as a vicarious emotional reaction based on the apprehension of another’s emotional state or condition, which involves feelings of sorrow, compassion, or concern for the other (Batson, 1991, labels our definition of sympathy as empathy). Conceptually, sympathy involves an other-orientation whereas empathy does not.
Another vicariously induced emotional reaction that is frequently confused with empathy and sympathy is personal distress (Batson, 1991). Personal distress is an aversive vicariously induced emotional reaction such as anxiety or worry which is coupled with self-oriented, egoistic concerns. Batson (1991) has argued that experiencing personal distress leads to the motive of alleviating one’s own distress. Empathy and related emotional reactions have received increasing attention from social and developmental psychologists in the last two decades. This is probably because of the strong theoretical link between empathy (and related constructs such as sympathy) and both positive social behavior and social competence (see Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Indeed, much of the recent research on empathy and sympathy has concerned a few topics: (1) gender differences in empathy; (2) the relation of empathy and sympathy to prosocial behavior (voluntary behavior intended to benefit another); (3) whether empathy or sympathy is associated with altruistic motive; (4) the relation of empathy to aggression; and (5) the development and socialization of empathy and related vicarious emotions.
Each of these topics is now briefly reviewed. Gender Differences in Empathy and Related Responses In reviews of gender differences in empathy, Eisenberg and her colleagues (Eisenberg, Fabes, Schaller, & Miller, 1989) found that gender differences in empathy and related vicarious emotional responses varied as a function of the method of assessing empathy. There were large differences favoring females for self-report measures of empathy, especially questionnaire indices. However, no gender differences were found when the measure of empathy was either physiological or unobtrusive observations of nonverbal behavior. Eisenberg has suggested that this pattern of results was due to differences among measures in the degree to which the intent of the measure was obvious and respondents could control their responses. Gender differences were greatest when demand characteristics were high (i.e., it was clear what was being assessed) and respondents had conscious control over their responses (i.e., selfreport indices were used). In contrast, gender differences were virtually nonexistent when demand characteristics were subtle and respondents were unlikely to exercise much conscious control over their responding (i.e., physiological responses). When gender stereotypes are activated and people can easily control their responses, they may try to project a socially desirable image to others or to themselves. In recent work investigators have attempted to differentiate between sympathy and personal distress using physiological and facial reactions, as well as self reports. They generally have found modest selfreported gender differences in sympathy and personal distress in reaction to empathy-inducing stimuli (females tend to report more), occasional differences in facial reactions (generally favoring females), and virtually no gender differences in heart rate findings. Findings for skin conductance are mixed. Overall the pattern of findings suggests that females are slightly more likely than males to evidence both sympathy and personal distress, but that the differences are quite weak (except for questionnaire measures) and dependent on method of measurement and context. Whether these slight gender differences are due to biological factors or socialization (or both) is not clear, although socialization clearly influences empathic responding (e.g.,Eisenberg, Fabes, Carlo, & Karbon, 192).
Egoism
Psychological egoism (sometimes called descriptive egoism) claims that every individual does, as a matter of fact, always pursue his or her own interests. In other words, it claims that people never act altruistically for the good of others or for an ideal. Since psychological egoism claims to state what is the case, it is a descriptive theory and so is very different from a normative theory such as ethical egoism, which purports to say how people ought to act. Psychological egoism seems to rest on either confusions or false claims. If self-interest is interpreted in a narrow or selfish sense, then psychological egoism is simply false. There are clearly many generous people who often sacrifice their own interests, including their money and time, to help others. Indeed, most of us are generous on some occasions. Some defenders of psychological egoism admit this fact but claim that it is irrelevant because even a person who is generous is acting on his or her own desire to be generous and, hence, is really being self-interested. The problem with this defense of psychological egoism is that it reduces psychological egoism to a logical necessity; the motive for any action must be that agent’s motive—this is logically necessary, for obviously it cannot be someone else’s motive. Other psychological egoists argue that what appear to be generous motives are always a front for some hidden self-interested motive. For example, Mother Teresa was really, they claim, motivated by a desire for fame or respect or a desire to get into heaven. The problem with this form of psychological egoism is that there is no reason to believe it is true. It is mere speculation and must always remain so since we can never have access to a person’s “genuine’’ motives. It may be believed mostly by people who are generalizing from their own ungenerous character.
A final form of psychological egoism rests on a confusion regarding the nature of desires and motives. Some psychological egoists argue that whatever selfish or generous desire motivates us, what we really want is the pleasure of satisfying our desire; thus, all human motivation is really self-interested. This misunderstanding was laid to rest in the 18th century by Bishop Joseph Butler and others, who pointed out that a person needs to have generous desires in the first place in order to get any pleasure from satisfying them. They also pointed out that supposing we have a second-order desire to fulfill our desires is redundant and involves an infinite regression.
Abraham Maslow
Maslow was born in Brooklyn, New York, on April 1, 1908, and died from a heart attack in Menlo Park, California, on June 8, 1970. For much of his professional career, he was a faculty member at Brooklyn College and Brandeis University. At Brandeis, he served as chairman of the Department of Psychology; moreover, he was president of the American Psychological Association from 1967 to 1968. Maslow first published his theory of basic needs in 1943. Other discussions of Maslow’s theory or hierarchy of basic needs can be found in his Motivation and Personality and his Toward a Psychology of Being.
The year after Maslow’s death, his widow, Bertha G. Maslow, in consultation with some of Maslow’s colleagues, published a collection of his articles and papers in the book Farther Reaches of Human Nature. This book also contains discussion on his hierarchy of basic needs; furthermore, it includes a comprehensive bibliography of Maslow’s publications and important unpublished papers. As a psychologist, Maslow’s most significant contributions were to the fields of humanistic psychology and transpersonal psychology, wherein many authorities recognized him as a leading pioneer, if not a founder, of these movements or forces in psychology.
In addition, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs has provided implications and applications for education, business management, and religion. It is a psychological theory with multidisciplinary implications and applications across contexts or settings. Although Maslow is primarily known for his writings on basic needs and self-actualization, his books, articles, lectures, and papers encompass a number of concepts of humanistic and transpersonal psychology. Most of these concepts are related to his theory of basic needs and self-actualization in some way and include topics such as peak experiences, human aggression and destructiveness, human values, growth, transcendence, humanistic education, creativity, religion, and holistic health. Nevertheless, from the broader perspective, his work’s theoretical focus is in the areas of human motivation and healthy personality, and his greatest contribution is probably to the development of positive psychology, humanistic psychology, and transpersonal psychology, or what is generally referred to as the third force in psychology.
Emotional Intelligence
The phrase emotional intelligence was coined by Yale psychologist Peter Salovey and the University of New Hampshire’s John Mayer five years ago to describe qualities such as understanding one’s own feelings, empathy for the feelings of others and ‘the regulation of emotion in a way that enhances living’. Their notion is about to bound into American conversation, handily shortened to EQ, thanks to a new book, Emotional Intelligence (Bantam) by Daniel Goleman. This New York Times science writer, who has a PhD in psychology from Harvard and a gift for making even the chewiest scientific theories digestible to lay readers, has brought together a decade’s worth of behavioral research into how the mind processes feelings. His goal, he announces on the cover, is to redefine what it means to be smart. His thesis: when it comes to predicting a person’s success, brain power as measured by IQ and standardized achievement tests may actually matter less than the qualities of mind once thought of as ‘character’, before the word began to sound quaint in the US.
Goleman is looking for antidotes to restore ‘civility to our streets and caring to our communal life’. He sees practical applications everywhere in America for how companies should decide whom to hire, how couples can increase the odds that their marriage will last, how parents should raise their children and how schools should teach them. When street gangs become substitutes for families, when school-yard insults end in stabbings, when more than half of marriages end in divorce, when the majority of the children murdered in the U.S. are killed by parents and step-parents – many of whom say they were trying to discipline the child for behaviour such as blocking the TV or crying too much – it suggests a need for remedial emotional education. While children are still young, Goleman argues, there is a ‘neurological window of opportunity’ since the brain’s prefrontal circuitry, which regulates how we act on what we feel, probably does not mature until mid-adolescence.
EQ is not the opposite of IQ. Some people are blessed with a lot of both, some with little of either. What researchers have been trying to understand is how they complement each other; how one’s ability to handle stress, for instance affects the ability to concentrate and put intelligence to use. Among the ingredients for success, researchers now generally agree that IQ counts for only 20%; the rest depends on everything from social class to luck to the neural pathways that have developed in the brain over millions of years of human evolution.
Emotional life grows out of an area of the brain called the limbic system, specifically the amygdala, where primitive emotions such as fear, anger, disgust and delight originate. Millions of years ago, the neocortex was added, enabling humans to plan, learn and remember. Lust grows from the limbic system; love, from the neocortex. Animals such as reptiles, which have no neocortex, cannot experience anything like maternal love. This is why baby snakes have to hide to avoid being eaten by their parents.
Humans, with their capacity for love, will protect their offspring, allowing the brains of the young time to develop. The more connections there are between the limbic system and the neocortex, the more emotional responses are possible. If emotional intelligence has a cornerstone on which most other emotional skills depend, it is a sense of self-awareness, of being smart about what we feel. A person whose day starts badly at home may be grouchy all day at work without quite knowing why. Once an emotional response comes into awareness – or, physiologically, is processed through the neocortex – the chances of handling it appropriately improve. Scientists refer to ‘metamood’, the ability to pull back and recognize that what I’m feeling is anger – or sorrow, or shame.
Ethical Naturalism
Ethical naturalism is the view that ethical claims are either true or false and that their truth or falsity is determined by reference to the external world, either facts about human nature or facts about the physical world beyond humans. Ethical naturalism contrasts with ethical nonnaturalism, which is the view that ethical claims are either true or false but their truth or falsity is not determined by facts about the natural, physical world. There are two main versions of ethical naturalism. The first can be called virtue-based naturalism. According to standard versions of this view, the question of which acts are right and which are wrong for a person to perform can be answered by appealing to claims about which acts would promote and which would undermine that person’s living a life that is good for human beings to live. This is a natural approach to ethics as it purports to explain when an act is right or wrong in a fully natural way, without referring to any nonnatural source of moral value. This virtue-based naturalism is based on the view that there is a distinctive way of living that human beings are best suited to pursuing and that if they were to pursue this, they would flourish. The primary objection to such virtue-based naturalism is that there is no such distinctively human life, and so it is not possible to determine if an act is right or wrong in terms of whether it is in accord with such a life or not. It is also often charged that this approach to naturalism faces an epistemological difficulty: that even if there was a distinctively human life that could ground claims about the rightness or wrongness of actions in this way, we would not know what form it would take. However, even if this last objection is correct, that we cannot have this access to the rightness or wrongness of actions, it does not show that this naturalistic account of what makes an action right or wrong is incorrect. It just shows that we cannot know when an action is right or wrong.
The second version of ethical naturalism, which can be termed metaethical naturalism, is the view that moral philosophy is not fundamentally distinct from the natural sciences. This is the version of ethical naturalism that is most often understood to be at issue in discussions of the “naturalistic” approach to ethics. On this approach to naturalism, moral value—that is, roughly, the rightness or wrongness of an action— should be understood as being defined in terms of (or constituted by, or supervening on) natural facts and properties. For example, John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian approach to ethics was a naturalistic approach of this sort. For Mill, an action was morally right insofar as it tended to promote happiness and wrong insofar as it failed to do so. Since for Mill happiness was defined in terms of pleasure and the absence of pain, which are natural properties, the rightness or wrongness of an action can be explained in terms of natural properties. Although not all metaethical naturalists accept Mill’s account of what explains the rightness or wrongness of actions, they all share his belief that moral values (such as rightness and wrongness) can be understood in terms of natural facts about the physical world. For such naturalists, moral claims should be understood in terms of features of the natural world that are amenable to scientific analysis. This does not mean that moral philosophy should become simply another branch of science. Rather, it simply means that there are likely to be regular or lawlike relationships between physical properties and moral properties. Moral claims are thus claims about natural facts about the world. Metaethical naturalism is thus a type of moral realism, the view that moral claims are not merely expressive statements but are literally true or false. Thus, when people say, “Price-gouging is morally wrong,” they are not merely expressing their personal view concerning price-gouging. Rather, they are stating that they believe that it is a fact that price-gouging is morally wrong— and so, like other claims about facts, this moral claim (and all others) is either right or wrong. Like virtue-based naturalism, scientific metaethical naturalism faces some serious objections. Some object that this version of naturalism is untenable because it is not clear how to derive ethical claims from descriptions of reality. But, as was noted above with respect to the epistemological objection to the virtue-based account of naturalism, this doesn’t show that this naturalistic approach to ethics is mistaken. It just shows that we cannot know when an act is right or wrong. Amore famous objection to metaethical naturalism was offered by G. E. Moore. Moore claimed that naturalists were guilty of the “naturalistic fallacy.” This fallacy was to draw normative conclusions from descriptive premises. Thus, since naturalists infer from the fact that an action has a certain natural property (e.g., it maximizes pleasure) that it has a certain moral, normative property (e.g., it is right and should be performed), they are, according to Moore, guilty of this fallacy. Naturalists respond to this objection by noting that they do not need to rely on only descriptive premises in their inferences from natural properties to moral properties. They could insert into such inferences a premise such as “Whatever act has natural property X is a right act.” With this premise in place, the naturalists’ inferences are not fallacious.
A similar objection to naturalism was offered by Moore in his “open question argument.” Moore argued that any naturalistic account of a moral property would face the difficulty of explaining how it is that a person who understood both the naturalistic account and the moral property could still question whether the moral property was present when the natural one was. For example, a person who understood what it was to maximize happiness and understood what it meant for an act to be right could still wonder whether an act that maximized happiness was a right act. If, however, the rightness of an act was instantiated by that act’s maximization of happiness, this question would not be open in this way, just as the question “Is this unmarried woman a spinster?” is not open. In response to this objection, metaethical naturalists note that the meaning of moral terms might not be as obvious to people who seem to understand them as Moore assumes. Thus, a person might be able to use moral terms correctly but still be ignorant of what criteria must be met for an act to be a right act. Such persons would be competent users of the moral terms they deploy but would lack the understanding that Moore assumes they have. If ethical naturalism is true, this will have important implications for business ethics. If it is true that ethical claims are either true or false and that their truth or falsity is determined by reference to the external world, then there will be objective ethical truths that are independent of the beliefs of humans. If this is so, then it will not be true that ethical practices vary across cultures. For example, it will not be true that bribery is ethically acceptable in some countries, whereas it is not in others. Instead, there will just be one set of ethical practices that applies universally.
Aura
An aura is an energy field or life force that supposedly surrounds every living thing and natural object, including rocks. People who believe in auras say that in living things this energy field changes in accordance with its health, and in human beings, it changes in accordance with emotions, feelings, and thoughts as well. In addition, each human being is said to have a unique aura; when two auras come into contact when two people meet, the auras affect one another, with one taking some energy from the other and vice versa. This phenomenon, believers say, is why one person sometimes feels “drained” or tired after talking to another. Some people claim to be able to see auras, usually while in a relaxed or meditative state. They report that an aura is a colored outline or series of outlines, a colored band or series of colored bands of varying widths, or a halo of one or more colors, beginning at the surface of an object or being and emanating outward. Believers in auras also sometimes say that each aura has seven layers, with the layer at the skin much denser than each successive layer outward, and that each layer can be associated with one of seven energy portals that connect the mind to certain parts of the body. These portals, known as chakras, are the reason, believers say, that the color, intensity, and/or outline of an aura can indicate the health of various body parts.
Believers disagree on how various health problems correspond to the colors of an aura, but they generally contend that a vibrant aura with a distinct outline means that a person is healthy, whereas a weak, blurry aura that does not completely surround the subject is a sign of either mental or physical illness. Some believers, for example, say red is a warning color, suggesting that some part of the body is developing a serious health problem, and that red indicates pain and/or swelling as well as anger and aggression. Green, on the other hand, is the color of calm emotions and can indicate that a person’s body is healing or healthy. Some believers say that orange auras also indicate health, but others say that this depends on the shade of orange, because brownish orange auras are a sign of a severe illness or emotional imbalance. Most believers agree, however, that indigo indicates a person with psychic abilities and that black auras usually indicate that a person has a terminal illness and/or is so severely depressed that he or she is suicidal.
Among those who believe that auras can be indicative of a person’s health is parapsychologist Thelma Moss, who argues that the phenomenon can be used to diagnose specific illnesses. While working at the University of California, Los Angeles, Neuropsychiatric Institute, she wrote the first books to seriously examine the medical aspects of auras, The Body Electric (1979) and The Probability of the Impossible (1983). In these works, Moss advocates that Kirlian photography be used as a medical diagnostic tool. With Kirlian photography, any object, whatever it is made of, is placed against a photographic plate and subjected to a high-voltage electric field or current; the result is a photographic image of the object, surrounded by one or more radiant outlines of varying colors and widths. Supporters of Kirlian photography as a diagnostic tool say that these glowing coronas of light are auras, but skeptics say that they are a by-product of the photographic process itself; in other words, the electrical charge, rather than the object being photographed, is somehow producing the visual effect. Skeptics similarly dismiss claims by people who say they can see auras with the naked eye. Skeptics say these individuals are suffering from a neurological or vision disorder that produces the colored rings or bands. Indeed, physicians know that such disorders can create such false images. Still, there is no sign that the individuals who claim to see auras suffer from a physical or mental illness.
Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) philosopher, psychologist
Sigmund Freud was born in Freiberg, today in the Czech Republic, to Jewish parents, Jacob Freud, a small-time textile merchant, and Amalia Freud. Although the family was Jewish, Jacob Freud was not at all religious, and Sigmund Freud grew up an avowed atheist.When he was four years old, the family moved to Vienna, Austria, where Freud lived for most of his life. He was a brilliant student, always at the head of his class; however, the options for Jewish boys in Austria were limited by the government to medicine and law. As Freud was interested in science, he entered the University of Vienna medical school in 1873. After three years, he became deeply involved in research, which delayed his M.D. until 1881. Independent research was not financially feasible, however, so Freud established a private medical practice, specializing in neurology. He became interested in the use of hypnosis to treat hysteria and other mental illnesses, and with the help of a grant, he went to France in 1885 to study under Jean-Martin Charcot, a famous neurologist, known all over Europe for his studies of hysteria and various uses of hypnosis. On his return to Vienna in 1886, Freud married and opened a practice specializing in disorders of the nervous system and the brain. He tried to use hypnosis to treat his patients but quickly abandoned it, finding that he could produce better results by placing patients in a relaxing environment and allowing them to speak freely. He then analyzed whatever they said to identify the traumatic effects in the past that caused their current suffering. The way his own self-analysis contributed to the growth of his ideas during this period may be seen in letters and drafts of papers sent to a colleague,Wilhelm Fliess.
After several years of practice, Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), the first major statement of his theories, in which he introduced the public to the notion of the unconscious mind. He explains in the book that dreams, as products of the unconscious mind, can reveal past psychological traumas that, repressed from conscious awareness, underlie certain kinds of neurotic disorders. In addition, he attempts to establish a provisional matrix for interpreting and analyzing dreams in terms of their psychological significance. In his second book, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), Freud expands the idea of the unconscious mind by introducing the concept of the dynamic unconscious. In this work, Freud theorizes that everyday forgetfulness and accidental slips of the tongue (today commonly called Freudian slips) reveal many meaningful things about the person’s unconscious psychological state. The ideas outlined in these two works were not taken seriously by most readers, which is not a surprise considering that, at the time, most psychological disorders were treated as physical illnesses, if treated at all.
Freud’s major clinical discoveries, including his five major case histories, were published in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905). In this work, he elaborates his theories about infantile sexuality, the meanings of the id, the ego, and the superego, and the Oedipus complex (the inevitable but tabooed incestuous attraction in families, and the associated fear of castration and intrafamilial jealousy).
In 1902, Freud was appointed full professor at the University of Vienna and developed a large following. In 1906, he formed the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, but some political infighting resulted in division among members of the group (Carl Jung, for instance, split from the group with bitter feelings). Freud continued to work on his theories and, in 1909, presented them internationally at a conference at Clark University in Massachusetts. Freud’s name became a household word after the conference. In his later period, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and The Ego and the Id (1923), he modified his structural model of the psychic apparatus. In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926), he applied psychoanalysis to larger social problems. In 1923, Freud was diagnosed with cancer of the jaw as a result of years of cigar smoking. In 1938, the Nazi party burned Freud’s books. They also confiscated his passport, but the leading intellectuals around the world voiced their protest, and he was allowed to leave Austria. Freud died in England in 1939.
Freud made an enormous contribution to the field of psychology: He established our basic ideas about sexuality and the unconscious and also influenced, to some extent, the way we read literary works by establishing remises for psychoanalytic criticism. His own case studies are often interpreted for their literary merit.
Intelligence Quotient (IQ)
Intelligence is a construct that has been proposed by psychologists to underlie much of human behavior and is a significant factor contributing to an individual’s ability to do some things more or less well. Most would agree that some children are better at math or language arts than others, or that some hockey players or musicians are gifted in comparison to their peers. It might be argued that some individuals are born that way, whereas others have the benefit of good environments and learning opportunities that can build on their basic abilities. The intelligence test, and resulting intelligence quotient or IQ, is a means for assessing and measuring intelligence, with the results often used to classify or select persons or predict such outcomes as school achievement.
Both the construct of intelligence and its measurement are not new, and both existed well before the advent of psychological science. Historians have traced the forerunner of current cognitive ability and achievement assessment to more than 2000 years B.C. Although intelligence has been studied in a number of ways, from an early emphasis on sensory processes to the more current attention given to brain-imaging techniques, the mainstay in the study and assessment of intelligence has been the IQ test. Psychologists not only assess intelligence but also study how intelligence is expressed; what causes it; and how it contributes to understanding, explaining, predicting, and even changing human behavior. Despite intelligence being a much studied area of psychology, there is still considerable controversy and emotion regarding the use of the IQ and intelligence tests and the results gleaned from them in such contexts as schools and industry to describe both individuals and groups. Given continued advances in the theories of intelligence and cognitive assessment instruments, the issue appears to be less with the constructs and the tests used to measure it, and more with how this information is or can be used.
Theories of Intelligence
Psychology joined the scientific community in the late 1800s, and since then, a number of theories outlining human intelligence, accompanied by a huge body of research, have emerged. The hallmark of science and scientific inquiry is the creation of theories and the pursuit of empirical support for the hypotheses that are generated by and from a particular theory. The current theories of intelligence attempt to explain what it is, what causes it, and what intelligence tells us about other human behaviors.
Although research has demonstrated that there is a considerable genetic component to intelligence, it is also recognized that intelligence is an acquired ability that reflects opportunity and experience such as comes from effective schooling and home environments. Studies showing the remarkable similarity in measured ability between twins, whether reared together or apart, provide much evidence for a genetic foundation to intelligence. However, intelligence appears to be polygenic rather than located on a specific gene. Studies have also shown that animals raised in very restricted in contrast to ‘‘rich’’ environments not only show considerable differences in, say, their capacity to solve problems, but also show an impact on their brain structures (e.g., number of neural connections). As well, research has shown how the effects of poverty and restricted educational opportunities can negatively influence human development, including intelligence.
Among the environmental factors that are known to directly influence brain functioning and thus intellectual development and expression are various medical conditions, neurotoxins, drugs such as alcohol (certainly during pregnancy, as observed in children diagnosed with fetal alcohol syndrome), and chemical pollutants such as lead and mercury. Almost anything that negatively affects the brain, such as head injury and oxygen deprivation, will have small or large observed effects on intelligence and its expression. Less obvious but just as important are such additional factors as motivation, selfconcept, and anxiety, all of which can influence a person’s score on an IQ or intelligence test and their everyday functioning at work or school.
Culture also affects the expression of intelligence. Although there is a universal ability related to the capacity to acquire, store, retrieve, and use information from everyday experiences as well as from direct teaching (e.g., school), how this is expressed, the content of a person’s response to a question, and the language used in providing an answer to a question all reflect the interaction between the person’s genetic capacities and the environmental opportunities for intelligence. In addition, arguments have been made that what constitutes intelligence may vary across cultures and that different ethnic groups may have differing, but equally intelligent, reasoning strategies. On the other hand, the successful adaptation of contemporary assessment instruments for use in a large number of countries suggests that central abilities and capacities comprising intelligence may be shared across cultures. It should also be pointed out that intelligence is also a developmental construct. A 5-year-old child has a very different view of, say, cause–effect relationships or the understanding of number concepts than does a 15-year-old in Grade 10 or a 35-year-old with a university degree or a 50-year-old working in a factory. Brain maturation very much influences the qualitative description of intelligence. At the same time, it has been demonstrated that intelligence does change across the life span, with some kinds of intelligence referred to as crystallized intelligence (e.g., a person’s knowledge of words and language, learned skills such as solving arithmetic problems) more likely to remain unaffected and possibly continue to improve with age than are abilities reflecting fluid intelligence and speed of processing information (reflecting neural efficiency), barring, of course, dementia and other diseases underlying cognitive decline.
Another debate found in theoretical discussions and observed in models of intelligence is centered on whether intelligence is a single characteristic or is composed of several or even multiple abilities. These views can be traced back to the turn of the previous century, when psychologists such as Spearman argued that intelligence was a set of specific but related factors that resulted in an overarching general factor (essentially similar to the current full-scale IQ [FSIQ] score found on many tests). In contrast, Thurstone proposed that intelligence was made up of a number of primary mental abilities that could not be captured in a single summary score or an FSIQ.
Today’s tests and models continue to reflect these divergent viewpoints. For example, psychologists such as Guilford have proposed that intelligence may have 120 or more facets, while Wechsler has argued for the relevance of the FSIQ (but also the importance of looking at both verbal and nonverbal performance). Other current models proposed by Sternberg, describe intelligence along the lines of practical, analytical, and creative abilities, whereas Gardner suggests that there are likely eight to nine core kinds of intelligence reflecting, for example, interpersonal intelligence (required for effective social interaction and communication), kinesthetic intelligence (observed in athletes who excel in their sport), musical ability (found in performers and composers), and logical-mathematical intelligence (reflecting the capacity to reason logically in mathematics and science such as physics). Other views, drawing from the work of Piaget, focus more on how intelligence develops (in stages) and how it can be encouraged through direct instruction and supportive learning environments (e.g., instrumental enrichment). Thus, there is quite some diversity in how intelligence is defined, determining the key factors that affect its development and expression, and how it is best measured. Although this may be perplexing to some, it does show how complex intelligence is and, even more so, how very complex human behavior is. At the same time, a great deal is known about intelligence and what it tells us about human behavior. For example, intelligence tests, yielding a measure of general mental ability, are one of the best predictors of student achievement and success in elementary schools. On the other hand, and as expected, intelligence tests have been found to be more limited in predicting achievement among intellectually homogeneous populations. For example, university students generally possess average or above-average levels of intelligence such that divergent performance in this group appears to be more highly related to specific cognitive competencies (e.g., high aptitude in math) and personal attributes (e.g., motivation, study skills). Intelligence is additionally considered a key factor in understanding human capacity to manage stress and develop resiliency, psychological well-being, and even longevity.
History of Intelligence Testing
The very earliest tests of intelligence were not based on any particular scientific views and in many instances simply showed the wide or narrow range of performance on such tasks as strength of grip or pitch discrimination. More to the point, these tests did not tell us about other human characteristics that, by expectation, they should. If intelligence is an underlying capacity that influences how well a person does in school, or a person’s accuracy at solving arithmetic problems, or the speed at which he or she can perform other mental tasks, then the tests should be correlated with those behaviors and be able to predict how well a person may perform on those tasks requiring intelligence. In contrast to the earliest tests of intelligence, more recent intelligence tests have resulted from extensive research efforts, while still garnering a great deal of misunderstanding from the general public. The first successful intelligence tests were developed by Binet and Simon at the turn of the last century and used in the schools of Paris, France, to help identify and classify schoolchildren according to their ability to learn and whether they would benefit from regular or special school programs. A short time later, these tests were introduced in the United States. Along with the Army Alpha and Beta intelligence tests used to screen military recruits during World War I, there was growing opinion that intelligence tests had considerable value for purposes ranging from personnel selection to identifying children who were intellectually gifted or retarded. These early landmarks in the history of testing laid the foundation for the advancement and proliferation of subsequent intelligence tests. For example, the first intelligence test created by Wechsler, in 1939, has evolved into several recently published tests for assessing intelligence from preschool years to age 89, and these tests have now been adapted for use in a large number of countries. The number of tests available to psychologists for assessing cognitive abilities has grown considerably over the past 60 to 70 years.
Current Intelligence Tests
Today’s intelligence tests vary from very brief measures that assess only a limited or narrow part of the broader intelligence framework (e.g., Raven’s Matrices) to large comprehensive batteries that tap many different aspects of intelligence ranging from verbal comprehension and spatial reasoning ability to memory and processing speed (e.g., Woodcock-Johnson Cognitive). The large number of tests available also includes tests specific to various age ranges, both group and individually administered tests, brief and comprehensive batteries, and modified tests for use with, for example, hearing-impaired clients, or clients who are nonverbal or who are less proficient in English. The majority of intelligence tests require a welltrained psychologist administering subtests that require the client to complete a range of tasks. Two broad types of tasks are used on intelligence tests—verbal and nonverbal. Verbal tasks generally entail a verbally presented prompt or question and require an oral response such as defining words (What is a hammer?), responding to general information questions (What is the distance between the earth and the moon?), or identifying similarities between two words (How are convention and meeting alike?). Nonverbal tasks usually involve visual stimuli or materials and/or require a psychomotor response such as copying geometric patterns using blocks, identifying important parts that are missing from both common and uncommon objects, or identifying patterns within a visual array. Although instructions and prompts to nonverbal tasks are sometimes given orally, verbal requirements are minimized within some tests through the use of gestures, modeling, or pictorial directions.
Both verbal and nonverbal tasks can be employed to measure a wide range of cognitive abilities and capabilities. For example, short-term memory may be assessed through a task requiring a student to repeat a string of presented numbers (verbal task) or to touch blocks in a previously observed order (nonverbal task). Regardless of the types of questions used, the psychologist is careful to ensure that administration and nonintellective factors do not confound the information gleaned from these tests. For example, it is necessary to make accommodations for persons with, for example, visual, auditory, or motor problems, lest these interfere with their performance on tests that should be specifically tapping intelligence. The raw scores obtained on intelligence tests are given meaning by comparing them to the performance of large and appropriate reference groups. These group performance indicators, called norms, are based on extensive standardization studies whereby the test is administered to large numbers of examinees to both ensure that the test is working well and to build a comparison group that is similar on key characteristics such as age and that reflects the composition of the larger community (ethnicity, sex, socioeconomic status, etc.). An individual’s raw scores on the parts and the whole test are then converted to standard scores through the use of tables; these standard scores are often referred to as IQ scores, and in the case of, say, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children–Fourth Edition (WISC-IV), four index scores assessing verbal comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory, and processing speed, together with a full-scale IQ, are reported with the average score set at 100. Furthermore, based on the use of normal curve proportions, scores of 130 would represent intellectually gifted persons; this score is obtained by less than 2% of the population. Scores of 115 suggest high average ability that exceeds the scores obtained by about 84% of the population. In contrast, scores of 85 are seen as low average; a person with this score would have scored higher than 16% of the population, but some 84% of the population scored higher than him or her. For an intelligence test to be truly useful, it must demonstrate sound psychometric properties that include reliability and validity. For a test to be reliable, it should have a minimum of measurement error, thereby measuring with consistency and precision. Thus, a FSIQ score will have some error associated with it and should never been taken as an exact measure but rather one that reflects a range wherein the person’s true score is likely to be. Validity means that the test in fact measures what it is intended to measure. If the test is supposed to measure acquired knowledge or crystallized intelligence, then it should do just that and not do something else. Although it can be said that current intelligence tests are among the very best measures used by psychologists, certain caveats still apply. For example, no one test tells everything about a person’s full intellectual ability, because other factors, such as depression, low motivation, test anxiety, or cultural factors, can influence intelligence test scores.
Current Uses of Intelligence Tests
The use of IQ and other intelligence tests is a complex process that requires a comprehensive understanding and training in such areas as test principles (reliability, validity, test construction, norm groups, types of scores); human development; and test administration and interpretation. As such, certain state and provincial restrictions exist that limit who is permitted to administer and interpret the results. In general, the use of intelligence tests is limited to psychologists or other such individuals who have a minimum of graduatelevel training in psychology and assessment. Although most commonly used by school or clinical psychologists within school and clinical settings, intelligence tests may also be used by psychologists within other specializations (e.g., counseling, industrial organization, research) and in such additional settings as community and state agencies, workplaces, universities, and private practices. In part, the purpose for administering an intelligence test may vary to some extent depending on the reason for referral and who is administering it and in which setting. A school psychologist may use the results of an intelligence test to help decide which students should be selected for a gifted program, whereas a neuropsychologist may use the results to assist with determining the location and extent of a brain injury. In general, intelligence tests provide information that can inform a wide range of diagnostic and decision-making processes. Among the most common uses of intelligence tests are to assist with diagnostic and eligibility decisions, intervention planning, progress monitoring, and research into cognitive functioning.
Mental Age
Mental age is a central concept in the study of intelligence measurement. Jerome Sattler defined mental age as ‘‘the degree of general mental ability possessed by the average child of a chronological age corresponding to the MA score’’ (p. 172). As an example, a child assessed with a mental age of 9 is viewed as having the general mental ability of an average 9-year-old child.
From the perspective of intelligence measurement, each individual has two ages: a chronological age that is the number of years that the individual has been alive, and a mental age that is the chronological age of persons for which the test performance of the individual is the average test performance.
The mental age and the chronological age of an individual need not be the same. For example, if the mental age of an individual is greater than the chronological age of the individual, then one can infer that the individual has above-average intelligence or higher mental ability.
The mental age and the chronological age for an individual are used to determine the ratio IQ (intelligence quotient) of the individual. To compute the ratio IQ, one divides the mental age of an individual by the chronological age of the same individual and then multiplies that ratio by 100. For example, if a child has a mental age of 12 and a chronological age of 10, then the ratio IQ for that 10-year-old child is 120 (i.e., 12/10×100=120).
The ratio IQ was the measure of intelligence used in the 1916 and 1937 versions of the Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scale and on other tests of mental ability. The deviation IQ replaced the ratio IQ as the measure of intelligence used in subsequent measures of intelligence. The deviation IQ reflects the location of the test performance of an individual in a distribution of the test performances of other persons with the same chronological age as the individual, with the mean deviation IQ being typically equal to 100. For example, if an individual has a test performance that is less than the mean test performance for same-age peers, then the individual will have a deviation IQ less than 100. Neither the dated measure of ratio IQ nor the more contemporary measure of deviation IQ consistently provides concrete information as to the reasoning skills of individuals.
The mental age score may also be termed the ageequivalent score according to Sattler. The mental age score for an individual provides information as to what age group is most closely associated with the individual from the perspective of mental ability. As an example, a 12-year-old child with a mental age score of 14 indicates that the 12-year-old child has a mental ability more typical of 14-year-old children than of 12-year-old children.
Sattler noted that mental age scores have certain limitations. First, differences in mental age do not reflect the same differences in mental ability across the age spectrum. For example, the difference in mental ability between a mental age score of 5 and a mental age score of 2 tends to be greater than the difference in mental ability between a mental age score of 15 and a mental age score of 12. Second, the same mental age may reflect different capabilities for different individuals. For example, two children both with the mental age score of 12 may have answered different test items correctly.
Louis Thurstone was highly critical of the mental age concept. Thurstone argued that ‘‘the mental age concept is a failure in that it leads to ambiguities and inconsistencies’’ (p. 268). To Thurstone, mental age may be defined in two different ways. The mental age of an individual may be defined as the chronological age for which the test performance of the individual is average. The mental age of an individual may also be defined as the average chronological age of people who recorded the same test performance as the individual. To Thurstone, these two definitions do not engender the same numerical scores. In addition, if one accepts the first definition, one faces the problem that there may be many chronological ages for which a test performance is average. For example, a 16- year-old adolescent who provides a typical test performance for 16-year-old adolescents could be viewed as having a mental age of any score from an adolescent mental age score of 16 to an adult mental age score of 40. The average mental test performances of older adolescents and adults tend to be very similar. Thurstone did not support the continued use of mental age or IQ as a measure of intelligence. However, he did support the use of percentiles for sameage peers in designating personal mental abilities. For example, if the test performance of a 12-year-old child receives a score that is equal to the score of the median test performance among 12-year-olds, then that 12-year-old child may be viewed as receiving a percentile of 50 (i.e., the test performance of the 12-year-old child is equal to or greater than 50% of the test performances of all of the 12-year-old children who were tested). Despite the trenchant criticism of the mental age concept by Thurstone and the recognized limitations of mental age scores, noted commentators on intelligence such as Sattler and Lloyd Humphreys extolled the merits of the mental age score as an informative measure of mental ability. Both Sattler and Humphreys contended that the mental age score provides useful information about the mental capabilities of an individual. The mental age score provides information about the size and the level of maturity of the mental capabilities of an individual. The IQ score, whether the ratio IQ or the deviation IQ, provides no such information. Both Sattler and Humphreys contended that mental age will likely continue to be a popular and useful measure of mental ability. However, the suggestion by Thurstone that percentiles among same-age peers be used to index mental abilities continues to be worthy of further consideration. Only time will tell whether the percentile or some other index will replace mental age as a popular index of mental ability.
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